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Abstract— Decoy state quantum key distribution (QKD) has
been proposed as a novel approach to improve dramatically
both the security and the performance of practical QKD set-
ups. Recently, many theoretical efforts have been made on this
topic and have theoretically predicted the high performance of
decoy method. However, the gap between theory and experiment
remains open. In this paper, we report the first experiments
on decoy state QKD, thus bridging the gap. Two protocols of
decoy state QKD are implemented: one-decoy protocol over
15km of standard telecom fiber, and weak+vacuum protocol over
60km of standard telecom fiber. We implemented the decoy state
method on a modified commercial QKD system. The modification
we made is simply adding commercial acousto-optic modulator
(AOM) on the QKD system. The AOM is used to modulate the
intensity of each signal individually, thus implementing the decoy
state method. As an important part of implementation, numerical
simulation of our set-up is also performed. The simulation shows
that standard security proofs give a zero key generation rate at
the distance we perform decoy state QKD (both 15km and 60km).
Therefore decoy state QKD is necessary for long distance secure
communication. Our implementation shows explicitly the power
and feasibility of decoy method, and brings it to our real-life.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD)[1], [2] was proposed as
a method of sharing a key between two parties (normally
denoted by the sender Alice and receiver Bob) securely. It
would be impossible for an eavesdropper to attack the QKD
system without being detected. Assuming a perfect single
photon source is utilized, people have proven the security of
QKD based on fundamental laws of quantum physics [3], [4].
Unfortunately, in view of implementation, “perfect” devices
are always very hard to build. Therefore most up-to-date QKD
systems substitute the desired perfect single photon sources
by heavily attenuated coherent laser sources. QKD can be
performed with these laser sources over more than 120km of
telecom fibers [5], [6].
However, this substitution raises some severe security con-
cern. The output of coherent laser source obeys Poisson
distribution. Thus the occasional production of multi-photon
signals is inevitable no matter how heavily people attenuate
the laser. Recall that the security of BB84 protocol [1] is
guaranteed by quantum no-cloning theorem, the production of
multi-photon signals is fatal for the security: the eavesdropper
(normally denoted by Eve) can simply keep an identical copy
of what Bob possesses by blocking all single-photon signals
and splitting all multi-photon signals. Most up-to-date QKD
experiments have not taken this photon-number splitting (PNS)
attack into account, and thus are, in principle, insecure.
Is it possible for people to develop some special measure to
make QKD secure even with practical systems? The answer
is yes. From physical intuition, if Alice sends out a single
photon signal, and Bob luckily receives it, this bit (normally
defined as in “single photon state”) should be secure, because
Eve cannot split or clone it. Based on this intuition, rigorous
security analysis on practical QKD system is proposed by [7]
and Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP)[8], which is
based on the entanglement distillation approach to security
proofs.
The main idea of GLLP’s work is not to find which signals
are secure (i.e., single-photon signals), because it would be
beyond current technology. Instead, GLLP shows that the ratio
of secure signals can be estimated from some experimental
parameters, and secure key bits can then be extracted from
the raw key based on this ratio through data post-processing.
With the GLLP method the secure key generation rate,
which is defined as the ratio of the length of the secure key
to the total number of signals sent by Alice, is given by [8]
R ≥ q{−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q1[1−H2(e1)]}, (1)
where q depends on the protocol; the subscript µ is the average
photon number per signal in signal states; Qµ and Eµ are the
gain and the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of signal states,
respectively; Q1 and e1 are the gain and the error rate of the
single photon state in signal states, respectively; f(x) is the
bi-directional error correction rate [9]; and H2(x) is the binary
entropy function: H2(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x).
Qµ and Eµ can both be measured directly from experiments,
while Q1 and e1 have to be estimated (because Alice and
Bob could not measure the photon number of each pulse with
current technology).
GLLP [8] has also given a method to estimate the lower
bound of Q1 and the upper bound of e1, thus giving out the
lower bound of the key rate R. However, with coherent laser
sources, these bounds are not tight. It follows that the security
of practical QKD set-ups can be guaranteed only at very short
distance and very low key generation rate [8], [10].
A key question is thus raised: how can one extend both
the maximum secure distance and key generation rate of
QKD? The most intuitive choice would be to use a (nearly)
perfect single photon source. Despite much experimental effort
[11], reliable near-perfect single photon sources are far from
practical.
Another solution to increase the maximum secure distance
and key generation rate is to employ decoy states, using extra
states of different average photon number to detect photon-
number dependent attenuation. The decoy method was first
discovered by Hwang [12]. The first rigorous security proof
of decoy state QKD was presented by us [10]. It is shown that
the decoy state method can be combined with standard GLLP
result to achieve dramatically higher key generation rates and
longer distances [10]. Moreover, practical protocols with vacua
and weak coherent states as decoys were proposed [10]. Sub-
sequently, we have analyzed the security of practical protocols
[13]. Decoy method has attracted great recent interests [14].
The basic idea of decoy state QKD is as follows: Alice intro-
duces some some “decoy” states with average photon numbers
νi besides the signal state with average photon number µ
( 6= νi). Each pulse sent by Alice is assigned to a state (signal
state or one of the decoy states) randomly. Alice announces
the state of each pulse after Bob’s acknowledgement of receipt
of signals. The statistical characteristics (i.e., gain and QBER)
of each state can then be analyzed separately. Note that the
average photon number of certain state is only by statistical
meaning, while Eve’s knowledge is limited to the actual
photon number in each pulse, therefore Eve has no clue about
the state of each pulse. Eve’s attack will modify the statistical
characteristics (gain or QBER) of decoy states and/or signal
state and will be caught. The decoy states are used only for
catching an eavesdropper, but not for key generation. It has
been shown [10], [13], [14] that, in theory, decoy state QKD
can substantially enhance security and performance of QKD.
The power and feasibility of decoy method can be shown
only by implementing it. To implement decoy state QKD,
it is intuitive to utilize variable optical attenuators (VOAs)
to modulate the intensity of each signal to that of its state.
Actually, this is exactly the way we used.
II. IMPLEMENTATIONS OF DECOY STATE PROTOCOLS
In [10], [13], we have proposed several protocols on decoy
state QKD. The most important two protocols are the one-
decoy protocol (the simplest protocol) and the weak+vacuum
protocol (the optimal protocol). We have implemented both
of them, over 15km (the one-decoy protocol) and 60km (the
weak+vacuum protocol) standard telecom fibers.
A. Implementation of one-decoy protocol
In one-decoy protocol, people need only one decoy state
with average photon number per signal ν < µ. Alice could
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Fig. 1. Schematic of the set-up in one-decoy protocol experiment. Inside
Bob/Jr. Alice: components in Bob/Alice’s package of id Quantique QKD
system. Our modifications: CA: Compensating AOM; CG: Compensating
Generator; DA: Decoy AOM; DG: Decoy Generator. Original QKD system:
LD: laser diode; APD: avalanche photon diode; Φi: phase modulator; PBS:
polarization beam splitter; PD: classical photo detector; DL: Delay line; FM:
faraday mirror. Solid line: SMF28 single mode optical fiber; dashed line:
electric cable.
decide the values of µ and ν, and the ratio of number of
pulses used as decoy state to that of total pulses, then randomly
assign the state to each signal by attenuating the intensity of
each signal to either µ or ν.
We implemented the one-decoy protocol by adding acousto-
optical modulators (AOMs, including CA, DA in Fig. )
to a commercial “Plug & Play” QKD system manufactured
by id Quantique (Jr. Alice and Bob in Fig. 1). We choose
AOM to modulate the signals because we need this amplitude
modulation to be polarization insensitive.
This QKD system is based on a 1550nm laser source
with pulse repetition rate of 5MHz. Its intrinsic parameters,
including dark count rate Y0, detector error rate edetector, and
Bob’s quantum efficiency ηBob are listed on Table I.
Before experiment, we perform a numerical simulation
(discussed in detail in Section III) with parameters of our
set-up as in Table I and optimally set µ and ν to 0.80 and
0.120 photons respectively. The actual distribution of the states
is produced by an id Quantique Quantum Random Number
Generator. Around 10% of the signals are assigned as decoy
states as suggested by numerical simulation. This random
pattern is generated and loaded to the Decoy Generator (DG
in Fig. 1) before the experiment.
Here we describe the flow of the experiment. First, Bob
generates a chain of strong laser pulses by the laser diode
(LD in Fig. 1) and sends them to Alice through the 15km fiber.
Second, the pulses propagate through the AOMs (CA and DA
in Fig. 1, the function of CA as well as CG will be discussed
in the next paragraph), whose transmittances are set maximum
at this period. Third, each pulse is splitted by a coupler and
part of it will be detected by a classical photo detector (PD
in Fig. 1), which generates synchronizing signal to trigger
TABLE I
SOME INTRINSIC PARAMETERS OF THE QKD SYSTEM. THESE
PARAMETERS ARE DIFFERENT FOR THE TWO IMPLEMENTATIONS BECAUSE
THE SINGLE PHOTON DETECTORS OF THE QKD SYSTEM WERE ADJUSTED
BY THE MANUFACTURER BETWEEN THE TWO EXPERIMENTS.
Implementation Y0 edetector ηBob
One-Decoy 2.11× 10−5 8.27× 10−3 2.27× 10−2
Weak+Vacuum 6.14× 10−5 1.38× 10−2 5.82× 10−2
the Decoy Generator (DG in Fig. 1). Fourth, the generator
holds for certain time period, during which the pulses are
reflected by the faraday mirror (FM in Fig. 1) and quantum
information is encoded by the phase modulator (ΦA in Fig. 1).
Here comes the key point: fifth, the Decoy Generator (DG in
Fig. 1) will drive the Decoy AOM (DA in Fig. 1) to modulate
each pulse to the intensity (either 0.80 or 0.120) of the state it
is assigned to exactly when the pulse propagates through the
AOM. Sixth, the pulses (now in single photon level) return to
Bob through the 15km fiber again. Seventh, Bob decodes the
quantum information by modulating the phases of the pulses
by the phase modulator (ΦB in Fig. 1) and see which single
photon detector (APD in Fig. 1) fires.
The use of the Decoy AOM (DA in Fig. 1) shifts the
frequency of the laser pulses, thus shifts the relative phase
between pulses significantly. To compensate this phase shift,
another AOM, the “Compensating AOM” (CA in FIG. 1) is
employed to make the total phase shift multiples of 2pi. This
AOM is driven by the second function generator, “Compensat-
ing Generator” (CG in FIG. 1). Its transmittance is set constant
throughout the experiment.
Here we emphasize that the holding time of the Decoy
Generator (DG in Fig. 1) after being triggered by the photo
detector (PD in Fig. 1) must be very precise, because same
modulation must be applied to the two pulses of the same
signal to keep visibility high. In our experiment, the precision
of this holding time is 10ns.
After the transmission of all the signals, Alice broadcasted
to Bob the distribution of decoy states as well as basis in-
formation. Bob then announced which signals he had actually
received in correct basis. We assume Alice and Bob announced
the measurement outcomes of all decoy states as well as a
subset of the signal states. From those experimental data, Alice
and Bob then determined Qµ, Qν Eµ, and Eν , whose values
are now listed in Table II. Note that our experiment is based on
BB84 [1] protocol, thus q = NSµ /N , where NSµ is the number
of pulses used as signal state when Alice and Bob chose the
same basis, and N = 105Mbit is the total number of pulses
sent by Alice in this experiment.
Now we have to analyze the experimental result and esti-
mate the lower bound of key generation rate R. This can be
done by simply inputting the results in Table II to the following
equations [13]:
Q1 ≥ QL1 =
µ2e−µ
µν − ν2 (Q
L
ν e
ν −Qµeµ ν
2
µ2
− EµQµeµµ
2 − ν2
e0µ2
)
e1 ≤ eU1 =
EµQµ
QL
1
,
(2)
in which
QLν = Qν(1−
uα√
NνQν
), (3)
where Nν is the number of pulses used as decoy states, and
e0 (=1/2) is the error rate for the vacuum signal and therefore
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Fig. 2. Schematic of the set-up in weak+vacuum protocol experiment. Inside
Bob/Jr. Alice: components in Bob/Alice’s package of id Quantique QKD
system. Our modifications: AOM: Decoy AOM; FG: Functional Generator.
Original QKD system: LD: laser diode; APD: avalanche photon diode;
Φi: phase modulator; PBS: polarization beam splitter; PD: classical photo
detector; DL: Delay line; FM: faraday mirror. Solid line: SMF28 single mode
optical fiber; dashed line: electric cable.
the lower bound of key generation rate is
R ≥ RL = q{−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +QL1 [1−H2(eU1 )]} (4)
In our analysis of experimental data, we estimated e1 and
Q1 very conservatively as within 10 standard deviations (i.e.,
uα=10), which promises a confidence interval for statistical
fluctuations of 1− 1.5× 10−23.
Even with our very conservative estimation of e1 and Q1,
we got a lower bound for the key generation rate RL = 3.6×
10−4 per pulse, which means a final key length of about L =
NR ≃ 38kbit. We also calculated Rperfect = 1.418× 10−3,
the theoretical limit from the case of infinite data size and
infinite decoy states protocol, by using Eq. (1). We remark
that our lower bound RL is indeed good because it is roughly
1/4 of Rperfect.
B. Implementation of weak+vacuum protocol
Weak+Vacuum protocol is similar to one-decoy protocol
except that it has one more decoy state: the vacuum state,
which has zero intensity. The vacuum state is to detect the
background count rate. We hereby use the same notation for
intensities as Subsection II-A: µ for signal state and ν < µ
for weak decoy state.
Weak+Vacuum protocol is theoretically predicted to have
higher performance than one-decoy protocol and is optimal
protocol in asymptotic case [10], [13]. Our numerical simu-
lation (detailed discussion in Section III) shows that for our
set-up (as in Table I), with data size of 105Mbit, the maximum
secure distance for one-decoy protocol is 59km, while that of
weak+vacuum protocol is 68km, as shown in Fig. 4. We chose
60km telecom fiber to perform weak+vacuum protocol.
The implementation of weak+vacuum protocol requires
amplitude modulation of three levels: µ, ν and 0. Note that it
TABLE II
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS IN ONE-DECOY PROTOCOL. AS REQUIRED BY
GLLP [8], BIT VALUES FOR DOUBLE DETECTIONS ARE ASSIGNED
RANDOMLY BY THE QUANTUM RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR.
Para. Value Para. Value Para. Value
Qµ 8.757× 10−3 Eµ 9.536× 10−3 q 0.4478
Qν 1.360× 10−3 Eν 2.689× 10−2 f(Eµ) [9] ≤1.22
would be quite hard for high-speed amplitude modulators to
prepare the real “vacuum” state due to finite distinction ratio.
However, if the gain of the “vacuum” state is very close (like
within a few standard deviations) to the dark count rate, it
would be a good approximation.
Our set-up to implement weak+vacuum protocol (Fig. 2) is
very similar to that of one-decoy protocol (Fig. 1) except for
the absence of the “compensating” parts (CA & CG in Fig.
1). This is because the frequency of the AOM (AOM in Fig.
2) has been precisely adjusted to the value that the phase shift
caused by it is exactly multiples of 2pi. In other words, this
AOM is self-compensated for our set-up.
We performed numerical simulation (as discussed in details
in Section III) to find out the optimal parameters. According
to simulation results, we choose the intensities as µ = 0.55,
ν = 0.152. Numbers of pulses used as signal state, weak decoy
state and vacuum state are Nµ = 0.635N , Nν = 0.203N , and
N0 = 0.162N , respectively, where N = 105Mbit is the total
data size we used.
The experimental results are shown in Table III. Note that
the gain of vacuum state (Y0 in Table III) is indeed very close
to the dark count rate (Y0 in Table I, third row), therefore
the vacuum state in our experiment is quite “vacuum”. We
could estimate the lower bound of Q1 and upper bound of
e1 by plugging these experimental results into the following
equations [13]:
Q1 ≥ QL1 =
µ2e−µ
µν − ν2 (Q
L
ν e
ν −Qµeµ ν
2
µ2
− Y U0
µ2 − ν2
µ2
),
e1 ≤ eU1 =
EµQµ − e0Y L0 e−µ
QL
1
,
(5)
in which
Y L
0
= Y0(1− uα√
N0Y0
),
Y U
0
= Y0(1 +
uα√
N0Y0
),
(6)
and QLν takes the value as in Eq. (3). Again, we estimate
Q1 and e1 very conservatively by setting uα = 10, which
promises a confidence interval for statistical fluctuations of
1− 1.5× 10−23.
A lower bound of the key generation rate RL = 8.45×10−5
per pulse is found by plugging the results of Eqs. (5) into Eq.
(4), which means a final key length of about L = NR ≃ 9kbit.
Note that, one-decoy protocol cannot give out a positive key
rate at 60km as suggested by numerical simulation. Therefore,
weak+vacuum protocol is on demand at this distance.
TABLE III
THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF WEAK+VACUUM PROTOCOL.
Para. Value Para. Value
Qµ 1.81× 10−3 Eµ 3.05× 10−2
Qν 5.47× 10−4 Eν 7.78× 10−2
Y0 6.02× 10−5 e0 0.51
q 0.319 f(Eµ)[9] ≤ 1.22
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Fig. 3. Simulation result of the set-up on which we implemented the one-
decoy protocol. Intrinsic parameters for this set-up is shown in the second
row of Table I. Solid line: the theoretical limit of key generation rate. Its
maximum transmission distance is about 90km. Dashed line: the performance
of weak+vacuum protocol. Its maximum distance is about 70km. Dotted line:
the performance of one-decoy protocol. Its maximum distance is about 64km.
Dashed and dotted line: the performance without decoy method. Its maximum
distance is only 9.5km.
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
Numerical simulation is crucial for setting optimal ex-
perimental parameters and choosing the distance to perform
certain decoy method protocol. Here we explain the principle
of our simulation, and show some results.
The principle of numerical simulation is that for certain
QKD set-up, if the intensities and percentages of signal
state and decoy states are chosen, we could simulate the
experimental results (gains and QBERs of all states). For
example, suppose we have a QKD set-up with transmittance
η, detector error rate edetector and dark count rate Y0, if the
output intensity is set to be µ photons per signal, the gain and
QBER of this state is expected to be [15]
Qµ = Y0 + 1− e−ηµ,
Eµ =
1
Qµ
(e0Y0 + edetector(1 − e−ηµ)), (7)
respectively. With these simulated experimental outcome, we
could estimate the lower bound of the key generation rate.
In experiment, it is natural to choose the intensities and
percentages of signal state and decoy states which could
give out the maximum key generation rate. This search for
optimal parameters can be done by numerical simulation and
exhaustive search. For example, we could try the values of
µ and νi, the intensities of signal state and decoy states,
in the range of [0, 1] with a step increase of 0.001. Similar
strategy can be applied on the percentage of each state. With
certain combination of intensities and percentages, the gains
and QBERs of different states could be simulated by Eqs.
(7), and the key generation rate can be estimated by the
chosen protocol, like Eqs. (2)(3)(4) for one-decoy protocol and
Eqs. (3)(4)(5)(6) for weak+vacuum protocol. We can therefore
find out the optimal combination that can give maximum key
generation rate.
Numerical simulation can also give the maximum secure
distance for certain decoy protocol and QKD set-up. The
transmittance of the system is a simple function of distance
[15] η = ηBobe−αl, where α(=0.21dB/km in our set-up) is
the loss coefficient. For a QKD set-up with known ηBob,
α, edetector, and Y0, we could find out the maximum key
generation rate of some protocol at distance l. The shortest
distance at which the maximum key generation rate for certain
protocol hits zero is defined as maximum secure distance for
this protocol on this set-up. It would probably be a waste of
time to perform certain decoy state protocol far beyond its
maximum secure distance.
We performed numerical simulation based on the set-up on
which we implemented the one-decoy protocol. The result is
shown in Fig. 3. The power of decoy method is explicitly
shown by the fact that the maximum distance in absence of
decoy method is only 9.5km. In other words, at 15km, not
even a single bit could be shared between Alice and Bob with
guaranteed security. In contrast, with decoy states, our QKD
set-up can be made secure over 60km, which is substantially
larger than the secure distance (9.5km) without decoy states.
The set-up on which we implemented the weak+vacuum
protocol is a bit different from the one we implemented
the one-decoy protocol because the single photon detector
had been adjusted by the manufacturer and several important
properties, including ηBob, Y0 and edetector, were changed, as
shown in Table I. The simulation result for this “new” set-up is
shown in Fig. 4. Clearly, the expected performance, including
the key rate of certain distance and maximum secure distance
of certain protocol, of this set-up is different from the previous
one. This difference is natural because the properties of the
system have changed.
The advantage of weak+vacuum protocol over one-decoy
protocol is shown by the fact that the maximum secure
distance of one-decoy protocol is 59km, which means that one-
decoy protocol cannot give out a positive key rate at 60km.
We confirmed this numerical simulation result by plugging
experimental results Qµ, Eµ, Qν and q from Table III into
Eqs. (2)(3)(4) and found indeed that key rate is not positive.
The maximum secure distance of our set-up is limited by
equipment, especially the single photon detectors we used
(APDs in Figs. 1&2). Given a better set-up (higher ηBob,
lower edetector and Y0), secure decoy state QKD can be
experimentally implemented over 100km, as shown in [13].
IV. CONCLUSION
For the first time, we have implemented decoy state QKD.
We have implemented two protocols: the one-decoy protocol
and the weak+vacuum protocol. Simple modifications (adding
AOMs) on a commercial QKD system are made to implement
decoy state QKD. The simplicity of the modification (much
simpler than building a near-perfect single photon source)
shows the feasibility of decoy method. Also, the high key rates
and long transmission distances (60km) show the power of
decoy method. Given better QKD set-ups, decoy state method
could make secure QKD at even longer distances.
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Fig. 4. Simulation result of the set-up on which we implemented the
weak+vacuum protocol. The intrinsic parameters of this set-up is shown in
the third row of Table I. Note that this set-up is different from the one we
implemented one-decoy as reflected by the fact that in Table I, the values
in row 3 are different from the values in row 2. Solid line: the theoretical
limit of key generation rate. Its maximum transmission distance is about
84km. Dashed line: the performance of weak+vacuum protocol. Its maximum
distance is about 68km. Dotted line: the performance of one-decoy protocol.
Its maximum distance is about 59km. Dashed and dotted line: the performance
without decoy method. Its maximum distance is only 14km.
We thus come to the conclusion: decoy method is ready for
immediate real-life applications!
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